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The purpose of this MBA Project is to identify financial, manpower, and time 
variables in the contract berthing budget line and to determine the effects of the variables 
on cost and efficiency statistics of the budget line given a continuance of current policy.   
A contract berthing budget line refers to the funding provided under a contract 
berthing policy to reservists to cover certain lodging and meal expenses. More 
particularly, selected Reservists (SELRES) are required to conduct drills for pay at their 
assigned Readiness Command (REDCOM), including the Naval Air Reserve (NAR) 
and/or Naval Air Facility NAF). REDCOMS are typically assigned according to the 
facility closest to the home of residence of the SELRES.  Under current Command Naval 
Reserves Forces Command (CNRFC) contract berthing policy, SELRES living more than 
50 miles from their assigned NAR are authorized lodging and meals expenses in addition 
to their drill pay.  
In this project, REDCOM statistics are analyzed to estimate the increase or 
decrease in funding required for contract berthing budget line. The current berthing 
process ad the potential future effects on th e50-mile radius rule of the contract berthing 
policy are also examined. The data included in this MBA project were generated in pre-
BRAC 2005 decisions; therefore, analyses in this project are based on that data. Finally, 
based on the foregoing analyses, an assessment is made as to whether changes to the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
The Director for Operations and Maintenance, Navy Reserve (O&M,NR) at 
Commander Navy Reserve Forces Command (CNRFC) has expressed interest in 
determining the implications of funding requirements for Contracting Berthing and 
possible revision to Contract Berthing policy.  Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC) 
mandates closing and consolidation of Navy Reserve Activities (NRA) with an associated 
effect of redistributing Selected Reserve (SELRES) populations.  Per 
COMNAVRESFOR P4000.1A, a Selected Reservist must reside more than 50 miles 
from their permanent drill site or NRA, and must be performing at least two Inactive 
Duty Training (IDT) periods (two four-hour drill periods) on the day before or day 
following to be eligible for lodging at government expense. 
Prior to the 2005 BRAC, the Navy Reserve Financial Managers allocated 
approximately $9.0 million per year. There is some reason to expect that base closures 
will compel the Navy Reserve Financial Managers to allocate more Operation and 
Maintenance Navy Reserve (OMNR) funding for Contract Berthing.   
The Operation and Maintenance Navy Reserve (O&M,NR) Director for 
Commander Navy Reserve Forces Command is faced with determining the effects of 
funding as it relates to contract berthing policy for reservists having to travel more than 
50 miles to their permanent drill site.  Commander Navy Reserve Forces is interested in 
the magnitude of any changes to possibly account for budgetary controls.  
B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this project is to analyze the financial, manpower, and time 
effects in terms of potential growth to the contract berthing budget line, assuming a 
continuance of current Contract Berthing policy. In addition, the efficiency or 
inefficiency of the current contract berthing policy is analyzed.    
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS  
The growth of the contract berthing budget is analyzed, assuming a continuance 




determination as to whether changes to the current policy for Contract Berthing eligibility 
warrant policy revision is discussed.      
Deliverables include an analysis with supporting information of financial, 
manpower, and time effects on Contract Berthing. This research will provide the 
Operation and Maintenance Navy Reserve (O&M,NR) Director for Commander Navy 
Reserve Forces Command with useful information for planning and budgeting.  
 
Figure 1.   Readiness Commands Map (Source: http://navyreserve.navy.mil) 
 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY  
The methodology of data collection for this MBA Project consists of interviews, 
literature review, and searches of official data.  Official sources include Department of 
the Navy (DON) reports, instruction, and memoranda. 
Commander Navy Reserve Forces Command (CNRFC) provided background 




Reserve (O&MNR).  Interviews conducted with Supply personnel at various Navy 
Reserve centers provide insights into the entire Contracting Berthing process.  
E. MBA PROJECT PREVIEW  
This report is presented in five chapters with supporting appendices. The report is 
organized as follows:   
1. Chapter I: Introduction 
This chapter introduces the research question, discuss the relevance of Contract 
Berthing and its current Contract Berthing Policy, and delineate the subsequent MBA 
project chapters.  I shall, also, discuss the research methods used and provide a summary 
of the findings.  
2. Chapter II: The Structure of the Navy Reserve 
This chapter discusses the overall mission of the Navy Reserve.  Second, it 
explains the structure of the Naval Reserve, regarding the roles and responsibilities of key 
players in the Operation Maintenance Navy Reserve (OM,NR).  
3. Chapter III: Contract Berthing Policy Analysis  
The economics of the Contracting Berthing policy stand upon the three pillars of 
finance, manpower, and time. Finance typically involves the appropriation of funds. 
Manpower mean reservist uses the resources. Time is important because of the valuation 
of time value of money. Each of these will be examined in greater detail. In short, this 
chapter shall provide an understanding of how finance, manpower and time affect 
contract berthing policy.  
4. Chapter IV:  Future Effects of Contract Berthing Policy 
Although available data predates Base Realignment and Closures legislation, this 
chapter outlines the BRAC process and conveys a broader perspective of the future 
effects of the BRAC process on Contract Berthing Policy.  The BRAC process entails 
three main parts that include, but are not limited to final selection criteria, force structure 
plan, and comprehensive base inventory. These three parts are evaluated to bring forth 
experience and understanding of the possible effects of the BRAC process on Contract 





5. Chapter V: Contract Berthing Data Analysis 
This chapter examines the data generated from each Readiness Commands.  The 
chapters provide graphs, evaluate quantifiable numbers, and choose alternative courses of 
action for contract berthing.  In other words, it takes the actual data and conveys the 
reason or causes for observable trends.    
6. Chapter VI: Contract Berthing Conclusion 
This chapter reviews whether the current Contract Berthing Policy is cost 
effective and efficient and summarizes the findings. Second, the chapter predicts future 
results based on various actions taken and recommends actions to impose management of 





II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE NAVY RESERVE 
A. GENERAL 
The overall mission of the Navy is prescribed by Title 10, U.S. Code, which 
states, “Be prepared to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea in support 
of the U.S. national interest.”  As defined in Section 262 of Title 10, U.S. Code, the 
mission of the Navy Reserve is to “…provide trained units and qualified persons 
available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency and at 
such other times as the national security requires.”  As the current trend of downsizing 
the active component of the armed forces continues, the need to use the Navy Reserve for 
contributory support will increase to an unprecedented level.1 Despite the need for 
increased numbers of navy reservists, BRAC 2005 mandates sweeping closures of Naval 
bases, including a surge of base closures for of the Navy Reserves. In view of the 
potential increase in the number of Navy reservists combined with the impending 
closures of Navy Reserve bases, a flexible and responsive analysis of the potential cost 
impact on Contracting Berthing will be valuable in determining the future resourcing 
requirements of this policy to allow for more accurate budgeting over the Future Years 
Defense Program (FYDP).2  
B. THE STRUCTURE OF THE NAVY RESERVE 
To understand the Contracting Berthing Process in depth, it is essential to have an 
appreciation of the structure of the Navy Reserve and the roles and responsibilities of the 
key players in the Contracting Berthing process.3  
For the first 140 years of its existence, the United States Navy lacked reserve 
program. With World War I developing in Europe and at the urging of Navy Secretary 
Josephus Daniels and Assistant Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt, Congress created the 
Federal Navy Reserve on March 3, 1915. In 1916, Congress passed a second law 
                                                 
1 Peacetime contributory support is a term used to describe the utilization of reservists to perform 
readiness-related activities supporting the mission needs of the active forces. 
2   The Future Years Defense Program is the database repository of all approved programs.  It 
summarizes resources (Total Obligatory Authority and personnel, and forces) by fiscal year.  




redefining and establishing the Navy Reserve Force. Over the past eight decades, the 
Navy Reserve has evolved into a well-structured and highly qualified component of the 
armed forces.4 The Navy Reserve currently comprises the Ready Reserve, the Standby 
Reserve, the Retired Reserve, and the Fleet Reserve, as hereafter discussed.  
1. Ready Reserve 
The Ready Reserve remains on standby to provide immediate assistance in 
response to national emergencies, such as the Global War on Terrorism. This component 
includes the Selected Reserve, full time support personnel, selected reserve unites. 
Individual Mobilization Augmentees, and the Individual Ready Reserve.  
a. Selected Reserve (SELRES) 
The SELRES are units and individuals designated by the Chief of Navy 
Operations and approved by the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff as so essential to initial 
wartime missions that they have priority over all other reserves.  The SELRES is the 
“core” of the Navy Reserve program.  SELRES is subject to involuntary recall for war or 
national emergency or by the President for up to 90 days to support operational 
requirements.  All SELRES are in active status and are required in Annual Training (AT) 
and Inactive Duty Training (IDT). 
b. Full Time Support (FTS) Personnel 
FTS are full-time active duty personnel who are responsible for assisting 
in the organization, administration, recruitment, instruction, training, maintenance and 
supply support to the Reserve components. 
c. Selected Reserve Units 
SELRES units are manned and equipped to serve and/or train either as 
operational or as augmentation units. Operational units train and serve as units; 
Augmentation units train together. When mobilized, however, the Augmentation units 
lose their unit identity, and are subsumed into an active unit or activity.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Marin, Robert. “The Reserve Personnel, Navy Manyear Rate Activity-Based Costing Model” (M.A. 




d. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) 
Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) are reservists attending drills 
who receive training and are pre-assigned to an Active Component organization, a 
Selective Service System, or a Federal Emergency Management Agency billet that must 
be filled quickly upon mobilization. IMA are trained on a part-time basis with these 
organizations to prepare for mobilization. Inactive duty training for individual 
mobilization augmentees are decided by component policy and can vary from zero to 
forty-eight drills a year.  Similar to SELRES, IMA are required to perform a minimum of 
14 days AT and 48 IDT drills each year.  
e. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) 
The IRR is a manpower pool consisting of individuals who have had some 
training, who have served previously in the Active Component or in the Selected 
Reserve, and who have some military service obligation remaining. Members may 
voluntarily participate in training for retirement points and promotion with or without 
pay.5  
2. Standby Reserve 
Those units and members of the Reserve Components (other than those in the 
Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve) who are liable for active duty only, as provided in the 
US Code, Title 10 (DOD), Sections 10151, 12301, and 12306.6 
3. Retired Reserve  
The Retired Reserves are members who receive retirement pay on the basis of 
their active duty and/or Reserve service.  Also in this group are the members who are 
otherwise eligible for retirement pay, but have not reached age 60 and who have not 
elected discharge and are not voluntary members of the Ready or Standby Reserve.7 
4. Fleet Reserve 
The Fleet Reserve is a valuable asset which affords the Navy the opportunity to 
employ members to fill billets requiring experienced personnel which avoids the costs 
                                                 







incurred by otherwise having to provide additional training. Fleet Reserve can only 
accept Regular Navy or Navy Reserve active duty members with a minimum of 20 years 
of active service and upon completion of 30 years of total service.  
C. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The roles and responsibilities of the personnel who are vital to the Navy Reserve 
are described as follows:  
1. Chief of Navy Operations (CNO) 
The CNO is responsible for the Navy Reserve organization administration, and 
training.  Also, the CNO is responsible for mobilization planning to effectively reinforce 
and augment active forces during war time.   
2. Resource Sponsors 
Resource Sponsors are Assistant Chiefs of Navy Operations (ACNOs), Deputy 
Chiefs of Navy Operations (DCNOs), and Director of Major Staff Offices (DMSOs), who 
utilize reserve manpower.  Fleet Commanders identify required reserve manpower 
through their respective Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC).  These resource 
sponsors coordinate with the Director, Navy Reserve (N095) on matters pertaining to 
their Navy Reserve Program.  
3. Navy Comptroller (NAVCOMPT) 
NAVCOMPT is responsible for the financial management of the Navy, including 
budgeting, accounting, disbursing, financing, internal review, and progress and statistical 
reporting for both active and reserve components.8 
4. Chief of Navy Personnel (CHNAVPERS) 
“Assistant Chief of Navy Personnel for Total Force Programming and Manpower 
(Pers-51) validates requirements identified by Echelon II commanders for reserve 
manpower.  Echelon II commanders are the fleet commanders.  The validation is done 
through the Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS), Ship Manpower 
Documents (SMD), and Squadron Manpower Documents (SQMD).  The Chief of Navy 
                                                 
8 Marin, Robert.  “The Reserve Personnel, Navy Manyear Rate Activity-Based Costing Model” (M.A. 




Personnel (Pers-9) is also responsible for the direction and management of the IRR, 
Stand-by Reserve, and Retired Reserve.”9 
5. Director, Navy Reserve 
The Director of Navy Reserve is the primary advisor to the CNO regarding 
matters of the Navy Reserve.  The Director is responsible for direction policy control 
administration, and management of the Navy Reserve for the CNO.  The duties include, 
but are not limited to, strategic planning and monitoring mobilization readiness of the 
Navy Reserve.  The Navy Reserve director employs budgetary support for programs 
relating to the Navy Reserve.   
6. Commander, Navy Reserve Forces Command (COMNAVRESFOR) 
“COMNAVRESFOR is an Echelon II field commander that is responsible for the 
management and administration of programs and assigned resources within the Navy 
Reserve.  COMNAVRESFOR is directly responsible to the CNO for proper training of 
reservists.  This training, whenever possible, mirrors the training received by the active 
forces.  To assist in meeting these various responsibilities, COMNAVRESFOR has one 
subordinate Echelon III commands that are headed by flag officers:” 
7. Commander, Navy Air Force Reserve Force 
(COMNAVAIRRESFOR) 
COMNAVAIRRESFORES is responsible to COMNAVRESFOR regarding the 
Navy Air Reserve Force.  COMNAVAIRESFORES is accountable for the operation and 
maintenance of aircraft that is managed by the Navy Air Force Reserve Force.  
According to OPNAVINST 101.21A, this responsibility extends to the training and 









                                                 
9 Marin, Robert.  “The Reserve Personnel, Navy Manyear Rate Activity-Based Costing Model” (M.A. 





























III. CONTRACT BERTHING POLICY ANALYSIS  
A.  INTRODUCTION  
The Commander of the Navy Reserve Forces Command has requested that the 
Navy review the effectiveness of the Contract Berthing policy.  
According to Vice Admiral Norb Ryan, “If bachelor quarters cannot be made 
available on base, contract berthing will be used as an alternate source of government 
lodging.  The primary source of contract berthing should be demand contract quarters that 
are arranged for by the local activity and paid through the travelers per diem.  Two other 
methods for providing contract berthing are:  contract quarters provided for short periods 
of time for a guaranteed number of travelers paid from base O&MN and leased quarters, 
quarters provided for extended periods of time for a guaranteed number of travelers and 
paid from base O&MN(see Figure 2; photo of bachelors quarters).”10  
In other words, contract berthing is a contractual agreement with the commercial 
hotels to provide a service to the overflow of Department of Defense personnel. The 
Contract Berthing policy states that reservist who commute more that 50 miles from their 
home to their work place qualify for contract berthing, contingent on non-availability 
within Bachelor Officer Quarters.11  
For example, a reservist lives in San Jose, CA and is assigned to Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, CA for one weekend each month, a distance of 
approximately 70 miles; the distance qualifies for lodging under the Contract Berthing 
policy, the reservist is privileged to take advantage of government lodging at NPS. If 
government lodging is not available, the reservist is privileged to obtain lodging at a 
commercial hotel in Monterey(Figure 2). If the reservist arrives at the naval base in  
 
 
                                                 
10 Smith, Samatha, Military Officers Association of America, Alexandria, Va, accessed 4 October 
2006; available from http://www.moaa.org/about/about_newsctr/about_newsctr_release/index.htm. 
11 P-502 Bachelor Officer Quarters is a three and four story, structural steel facility. The structure was 
constructed in and through a 10-foot layer of rock, cobble, and debris along Ballast Point, adjacent to the 




Monterey and finds the on-base facility Del Monte Lodge full, then the reservist is 
privileged to obtain accommodations at the Embassy Suites Hotel or a comparable hotel 
(Figure 3).  
 
 




Figure 3.   Embassy Suites Hotel Monterey Bay (Source: 
www.webtourist.net/usa/california/seaside/emb) 
 
B.  CONTRACT BERTHING ESSENTIALS 
The economics of the Contracting Berthing policy stand upon the three pillars 




Manpower mean reservist uses the resources. Time is important because of the valuation 
of time value of money. Each of these is next examined in greater detail.  
Congress grants finances to the Operational and Maintenance account to fund 
contracted rooms of local hotel. The Bachelor Quarter’s management must implement the 
guidance set forth. P4000 is a publication that guides management on day to day 
operation with contract berthing. This publication also gives the Readiness Commanders 
a snap shop of the contracting process. This chapter will discuss the contracting and 
bachelors quarters procedures, eligibility requirements and allocation of funds.  
1.  Benefit of Contracting Berthing 
Generally, contract berthing is offered to facilitate the highest drill participation 
and mobilize training. The P4000.1A, which is the bible for commercial and Bachelor 
Quarter berthing of drilling reservist’s state, “Commander Navy Reserve Forces activities 
will provide commercial and bachelor quarters berthing for Naval Reserve personnel 
traveling more than 50 miles to their drill site.” 12 Although, the P4000 acknowledges 
that these privileges are not granted to, or does not apply to Inactive Duty Trainers(IDTT) 
Active Training (AT) Active Duty Training(ADT) or Active Duty for special work.  
2.  Contract Berthing Eligibility Process 
Contract berthing eligibility process must be followed properly. The Bachelor 
Officer Management must ensure that they utilize all available on-base room assets 
before awarding contract berthing at a local hotel. In other words, managers must ensure 
bachelor officer quarters and bachelor quarters are used whenever quarters are available. 
The eligibility requirements for contract berthing are defined as: 
i. “Member must travel 50 miles or more from their residence to the 
permanent drill site where IDTs are performed.”13 
ii. “Member must be in a drill status and perform Inactive Duty Training at 
the permanent dill site.”14 
 
 
                                                 






iii. “Member must be performing 8 hours of scheduled drills (exclusive of 
meal period) on the day before or day following the use of commercial 
and bachelors quarters berthing, or four 4-hour drills within a 48 hour 
period.”15 
iv. “Berthing privileges may be denied for nonconformance to this section or 
local policy.”16 (see appendix for further details) 
 
Properly following the process will minimize government expenses and risk to 
contract berthing funding. Contract berthing funding comes from Congressional 
legislation to Commander of Naval Reserve. Commander of Naval Reserve obligates 
funds from the Operational Maintenance Navy Reserve (O&MNR) account to uses for 
contract berthing. If equally, ceteris pluribus, the management maximizes the assets of 
the Bachelor Officer Quarters.  
3.  Basic Understanding of Flow of Contracting Berthing Funds 
Operational Maintenance Navy Reserve funds flow from the Commander of Navy 
Reserve to the Readiness Commanders who will use the P4000 as guidance to allocate 
contract berthing funds. The funds are normally distributed to the Navy Reserve 
Activities such as Navy Air Facilities and Navy Air Reserve bases.  Commanding Officer 
and Officer in Charge are required to develop a local contract berthing policy to manage 
their berthing cost (appendix for an example of local policy). 
The berthing cost for Bachelor Quarters on average is $26. This $26 is divided 
into two cost categories. One is direct cost. The first category is direct cost. Direct cost is 
defined as labor and materials that can be identified physically in the product produced.  
For example, direct costs for an apartment building are construction materials and labor 
for bachelor quarters, and it can be physically traced to military construction, operation 
and maintenance navy reserve account, and utilities. The second category is indirect cost. 
Indirect cost can be defined as expenses that are difficult to trace. Indirect costs include 
travel pay, management service cost, etc. Contract berthing costs are obligation to local  
 
                                                 
15 Chapter 2. Commercial/BQ Berthing of Drilling Reservist. COMNAVRESFOR P4000.1A. 




hotels for drilling reservists who travel greater than 50 miles to their permanent station. A 
flowchart of the distribution and allocation of these contract berthing funds are shown 
below:   
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C.  CONCLUSION 
Contracting Berthing is a privilege and not an entitlement. This incentive or 
privilege is used to incentivize service with the Readiness Command. Contact berthing 
funding policy has strict eligibility requirements and should be followed closely.   
Bachelor Officer Management; however, must practice due diligence in the process of 
using all their rooms before awarding contract berthing. In other words, housing 
managers are the first line of defense to reduce and minimize the funding impacts of 
contract berthing funds flowchart, above, is provided to give a snap shot of how these 




IV. BRAC PROCESS AND THE FUTURE OF EFFECT ON 
CONTRACT BERTHING  
A. GENERAL 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) 2005 process and its effects on the Navy Reserve. Specifically, the BRAC 
process and one of its effects on the Navy Reserve is discussed. The heart of the BRAC 
criteria is force structure, selection criteria, and base inventory plans.  These plans helped 
Secretary Defense, Donald Rumsfield, examine these recommendations regarding bases 
to close, consolidate or realign. 
In their book, “Essence of Decision”, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow 
demonstrate that “Government decision-making is a complex multi-participant 
process”.17 Accordingly, base realignment and closure processes and results are the result 
of “compromise, conflict, and confusion among government officials with diverse 
interests and unequal influence”.18  The impetus of the BRAC 2005 process is evident in 
the President’s Message to Congress. The President stressed the advent of new threats to 
national security and advocated rethinking Defense priorities, force structure and the 
military. 
   As a result, the President informed Congress that the Administration would 
examine and scrutinize the capabilities and structure of the U. S. armed forces, but 
emphasized that several DoD reforms were needed immediately.  Stating, that “DoD 
wastes money on infrastructure it does not need,” the report went on to declare, “It is 
clear that new rounds of base closures will be necessary to shape the military more 
efficiently”.19  Thus, the BRAC process was used to change present military 
infrastructure to better to support joint warfighting, joint training and joint readiness.  
 
                                                 
17 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow., Essence of Decision.  (New York: Longman, 1999), 263.  
18 Ibid, 295. 
19 Robert C. Powers, “Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005: Congressional Dialogue and 




BRAC not only reshapes infrastructure, but it allows ways to innovate, consolidate, 
realign, and match facilities with military forces to make wise use of limited defense 
dollars.20    
B. BASIC BRAC CRITERIA 
The Department of Defense received congressional authorization for a base 
realignment and closure round in 2005.21  The 2005, Base Realignment and Closures 
process was a means to achieve several goals: eliminate excess physical capacity and 
infrastructure; optimize military readiness; realign infrastructure with future defense 
strategy; and capitalize on opportunities for joint activity.  At a minimum, this BRAC 
round was intended to eliminate excess physical capacity.  This would help the Defense 
Department save money, reduce hazardous waste and free up resources.  These goals 
were coordinated accordingly to the following: Final Selection Criteria, Force Structure 
Plan and Comprehensive Base Inventory. 
1. Final Selection Criteria 
The final selection criteria was used on February 16, 2004 by the Department of 
Defense to make recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations 
inside the United States under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, 
Public Law 101–510, as amended, 10 U.S.C. 2687 which notes: In selecting military 
installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority 
consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:
22
  
a. Military Value 
1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on 
operational readiness of the Department of Defense’s total force, including the impact on 
joint warfighting, training, and readiness.   
                                                 
20  United States Department of Defense, Base Realignment and Closure 2005, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/, December 15, 2005. 
21  Each round of BRAC results in the closure and/or realignment of selected military bases around the 
country. Congress has authorized another BRAC round for 2005 (Public Law 101-510 as amended through 
FY 2005 Authorization Act) 
22  L.M. Bynum, Department of Defense Selection Criteria for Closing and Realigning Military 
Installations Inside the United States, 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/docs/criteria_final_fedreg.pdf. 




2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace 
(including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout 
a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces 
in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations. 
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total 
force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations 
and training. 
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications. 
b. Other Connsiderations 
5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the 
number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for 
the savings to exceed the costs. 
6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of 
military installations. 
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities’ 
infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel. 
8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to 




Selection Criteria were guidelines used by the Department of Defense 
from which detailed measures for creating BRAC actions were drawn.  The importance 
of military value is reflected in the first four selection criteria and includes capabilities 
needed and effect on operational readiness.  “This includes the affect an installation has 
on joint warfighting, joint training and joint readiness.”24 The other considerations are 
based on potential cost of closing or realignments, economic impact on existing 
                                                 
23 L.M. Bynum, Department of Defense Selection Criteria for Closing and Realigning Military 
Installations. Inside the United States, 2004, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/docs/criteria_final_fedreg.pdf. (Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 29). 





communities, ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities’ 
infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel and environmental impact. 
According to the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld; however, decisions were 
determined by the installation’s current to military value and contribution to future 
mission capabilities. The 2005 selection criteria were a departure from previous practice.  





Figure 5.   Comparison of Base Realignment and Closure Criteria (Source: Kutak Rock 
LLP25 (need to cite source properly) 
                                                 
25 George Schlossberg, Base Closure Alert: Comparison of BRAC Selection Criteria, 2004, 
http://www.kutakrock.com/publications/federalpractice/BRAC%20criteria%20comparison%2015%20oct%




2.  Force Structure Plan 
“The Force Structure Plan (FSP) assesses the long-term security threats to the 
United States, and the projects the means necessary to counter them.”26  In accordance 
with Section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Public 
Law 101-510, as amended, the force structure plan (FSP) for Base Realignment and 
Closure (BRAC) 2005 was developed and submitted, via Congress, to protect the nation 
from threats for a 20-year period.27 In the BRAC rounds of 1988-1995, future assessment 
and projection of force structure for only six years were required.  The FSP projection 
focuses on Fiscal Years 2005-2011 and because of security classifications will not be 
fully disclosed.28  To maintain national security, however, the Department of Defense is 
transforming the framework in which the military fights the enemy into “A Capabilities-
Based Approach”.  The purpose of a capabilities based approach is to enhance capability 
and reduce vulnerabilities, thus enabling DoD to become smaller, and more agile.   
Furthermore, the Department of Defense is engaged in a long-term war on terrorism.  
This new enemy is aggressive, relentless, and adaptive; therefore, DoD must transform its 
understanding of warfighting.  Some people understand transformation to be about 
technology, but can also be about:  
• Changing the way we think about challenges and opportunities.  
• Adapting the defense establishment to the new perspective.    
• Refocusing capabilities to meet future challenges.    
The primary reason behind transformation is to change the mindset of government 
warfighters.  Transformation means divesting in some areas and investing in others to 
achieve future capabilities. It is evident that DoD needs to meet future warfighting 
capabilities, but transformation is not speaking just about warfighting.  It also represents 
restructuring business practices (e.g, financial management, supply and contracting).  In  
 
                                                 
26 George Schlossberg, Base Closure Alert: Comparison of BRAC Selection Criteria, 2004, 
http://www.kutakrock.com/publications/federalpractice/BRAC%20criteria%20comparison%2015%20oct%
2004.pdf (December 15, 2005) 
27 Ibid.  




short, a “Capabilities-Based Approach” transformation focuses more on how adversaries 
may challenge us rather than on who those adversaries might be or where we might face 
them.29 
3. Comprehensive Base Inventory 
“The Comprehensive Base Inventory describes “the baseline footprint” of 
installations that will be affected by BRAC 2005” and the force Structure Plan & 
Infrastructure (Base) Inventory to Congress.  As part of the FY 05 Budget justification 
documents submitted to Congress, the Secretary shall include the following: 
• A force-structure plan for the Armed Forces based on an assessment by the Secretary 
of the probable threats to the national security during the 20-year period beginning 
with fiscal year 2005.  
• The probable end-strength levels and major military force units (including land force 
divisions, carrier and other). 
• Major combatant vessels, air wings, and other comparable units needed to meet these 
threats, and the anticipated levels of funding that will be available for national 
defense purposes during such period. 
• A comprehensive inventory of military installations world-wide for each military 
department, with specifications of the number and type of facilities in use.   
• The active and reserve forces of each military department. 
• A description of infrastructure necessary to support the force structure described in 
the force structure plan. 
• A discussion of excess categories of excess infrastructure and infrastructure 
capacity. 
• An economic analysis of the effect of the closure or realignment of military 
installations to reduce excess infrastructure. 
• A certification regarding whether the need exists for the closure or realignment of 
additional military installations. 
• Certification that the additional round of closures and realignments would result in 
annual net savings for each of the military departments beginning not later than 
fiscal year 2011. 
• Feb 16, 2004 Final Selection Criteria. Not later than this, date the Secretary of 
Defense.30 
                                                 
29 Further details can be found on line at http://www.brac.gov/docs/DoDForceStructurePlan.pdf 
30 United States Department of Defense, Base Realignment and Closure 2005, 




The 2005 BRAC was similar to the previous four base closure rounds.  President 
George W. Bush nominated members of the Commission. The Pentagon provided a list 
of closure recommendations to the Commission. The Commission reviewed the list and 
submitted its own recommendations to the President. The President reviewed the 
recommendations and either accepted or rejected the list.  If the President accepted the 
commission recommendation, the list was forwarded to Congress.  At that point, 
Congress has 45 days to return their decision.  If the President, however, disapproves the 
commission recommendation then the BRAC process ends, i.e., the President accepts 
either all of the recommendation or none.   
“The same process was used to close 97 bases from all services in four previous 
rounds (1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995). However, that is where the similarities between 
those rounds and BRAC 2005 end.  The new BRAC commission incorporates two 
important changes. First, the group expands from eight to nine members to prevent tie 
votes. Second, any changes commission members want to make to the Pentagon’s list 
required seven votes. In the past, changes only required a simple majority.”31  
C.   FUTURE EFFECTS CONTRACT BERTHING 
The BRAC 2005 process has closed more reserve bases than any other single 
action in history and has forced the Navy Reserve Activities to make changes.  On 
average, BRAC’s consequences have affected more than one-hundred reserve bases 
throughout DoD.  For example, if the New Orleans region were closed, drilling reservists 
(weekend warfighters) affected would have to join new units. If Readiness Command 
South (located in Texas) were closed or transferred to another site then the 1,270 average 
monthly personnel traveling greater than 50 miles would still need to drill and therefore 
need contracting berthing. So, the Readiness Command is moved or closed, the people 
will still need a place to lodge. Although it is acknowledged that Readiness Commander 
feel as though that the Base Realignment and Closure process have minimum impact on 
contract berthing, it is reasonable to believe that bases that close will lose their berthing 
                                                 





assets. As a result, those rooms that were previously available for persons to utilize will 
no longer be provided because of Base Realignment and Closure process.  
 
Figure 6.   2005 Navy and Marine Corps Base Realignment and Closure Bases Reserve 
Centers Only 
 
All this affects the cost of contracts with local hotels.  These closures will cause 
the Navy Reserve to need more funding to lodging the sailors and marines during 







Figure 7.   2005 Navy and Marine Base Realignment and Closures with Reserve 
Centers 
 
D.   CONCLUSION 
Generally speaking, BRAC not only reshapes infrastructure, but it allows ways to 
innovate, consolidate, realign, and match facilities with military forces to make wise use 
of limited defense dollars.32    
The unintended consequences; however, effect the manpower, finance and time 
variables associated with contract berthing, which in turn, directly or indirectly affects 
contract berthing.   
The manpower variable may be affected, for example, by increases in the number 
of reservists requiring lodging. This increase is likely to occur when reservists that were 
“local” at a closing site may no longer be classified as such due to the distance between 
their residences and their new assigned drilling location (distance of more than 50 miles).  
                                                 
32  United States Department of Defense, Base Realignment and Closure 2005, 




The timing variable may be affected, by the closing and realigning of bases. In 
other words, some bases may not have the availability to lodge reservists.  
The finance variable may be affected by the change in the supply and demand 
mode.. As the demand for hotel accommodations, increases due to the increase in the 
number of reservistis requiring lodging without a reciprocal increases in the supply of 
hotel accomdations, it is assumed that the vendors will charge more for their services. 
This action, in turn, will increase the cost of Navy Reserve and contract berthing 
arrangement.  
A suspected outcome of the BRAC process, the, is a continued shortfall because 




























V. CONTRACT BERTHING DATA ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the data for three fiscal years generated from each 
Readiness Commands.  The discussion includes, but not limited to, manpower, finances, 
and time-forecasting as the determining factors of cost increase and decrease of contract 
berthing. The chapter provides graphs, evaluate quantifiable numbers, and highlights 
alternative courses of action for contract berthing.  In other words, it takes the actual data 
and analyzes the reason or causes of the problem.   
B. COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF READINESS COMMANDS  
With reference to Figure 8, the relationship between the number of personnel per 
person and expense per person is plotted. Figure 8 shows that as the number of personnel 
increase in the Readiness Command that average expenditure per person decreases. For 
example, Readiness Command South has a larger population of personnel and more small 
bases to house transient personnel than found in other Commands. As a result, Readiness 
Command South is most likely using its Bachelor Quarters to lodge the majority of its 
Inactive Duty Trainers. Conversely, as the number of personnel decrease in the Readiness 
Command the average cost of Contract Berthing on average increases. One reason is that 
cost is treated like a variable cost, meaning that when the demand of personnel is greater 
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Figure 8.   Number of Personnel versus Expenditure per Person 
 
Figure 9 shows the aggregate number of personnel traveling greater than 50 miles 
and the number of nights purchased by the Readiness Commands.  There has been an 
increase from 182,668 to 442, 755 in the number of nights purchased from FY03 to 
FY05.  With an increase in the number of nights purchased, it is obvious that the number 
of personnel traveling greater than 50 miles and the number of personnel has increased 
proportionately as depicted in the graph.   The interesting trend is the ratio of nights 
purchased versus personnel greater than 50 miles. The graph shows that as the number of 
nights purchased steadily increases over three fiscal years the number of people traveling 
decrease by three percent. Purchasing more rooms would give the impression that there 
are more people traveling greater than 50 miles. Therefore, an increase in personnel and 
the consolidation of bases the Navy will be forced to contract more rooms from the local 
community. Instead, fewer people are traveling more than 50 miles.  One possible 





traveling can be attributed to persons who were mobilized to fight the war on terror rather 







































































Figure 9.   Ratio of Nights Purchased versus Personnel Greater than 50 miles 
 
Figure 10 shows that fiscal years 2003 and 2004 are similar with regards to the 
number of personnel, number of personnel traveling greater than 50 miles, and number of 
nights purchased from 2003 and 2004.  It appears that REDCOMS manages personnel by 
the number of personnel traveling greater 50 miles because the figures are within a 
reasonable range compared to the fiscal years.  Fiscal year 2005, however, seems to be 
out of a reasonable range.  In 2005, the REDCOMS, on average, purchased three times 
more rooms than they had personnel.  It is not clear as to why, one can assume that they 
purchased rooms in lots and people did not utilize the contracted  rooms.  Nonetheless, I 





In addition, it is noted that the number of personnel is 52,571, 49,364, and 
165,285 for 2003, 2004, and 2005 respectively.  As one examines these numbers it 
appears that the 2003 and 2004 number of personnel is normal or within a reasonable 
range, but 2005 is out of range.  One expects that 2005 ought to be slightly higher than 
2004, but not tripled.    
Further, if one compares 2004 nights purchased to 2004 personnel traveling 
greater than 50 miles, it indicates that the Readiness Commands purchased, on average, 9 
rooms per person. However, comparing 2005 nights purchased (442,775) to 2005 
personnel traveling greater than 50 miles; it indicates that the Readiness Commands 
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Figure 10.   Number of Personnel/Traveling/Nights Purchased versus Number of Units 
 
Figure 11 depicts the increase in nights purchased by Readiness Command 




The increase in the number of rooms purchased between 2003 and 2004 was about two 
percent; this does not compare to a slight decrease in personnel over the same period.  
However, the increase of 58 percent in the number of rooms purchased between 2004 and 
2005 of 58 percent is much greater than the corresponding decrease in personnel, which 
was negative six percent.    
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Figure 11.   Fiscal Year versus Number of Nights Purchased 
 
Figure 12 depicts the average growth of the Readiness Command (REDCOMS).  
REDCOMS personnel growth has increased by 3.14 percent from 2003 to 2005.  From 
2003 to 2004, growth has decreased by 6 percent; however, from 2004 to 2005 personnel 
growth significantly increased to 3.34 percent.  The reason for this sudden increase from 
2004 to 2005 could be the recall to active duty and the mobilization of troops because of 































Figure 12.   Fiscal Year versus Number of Personnel  
 
Figure 13 shows a plot of the relationship between fiscal years (2003, 2004 and 
2005) and the number per year of reservist personnel who traveled more than 50 miles 
per year by reservist personnel. In fiscal year 2003 and 2004, 17 percent of personnel 
travel greater than 50 miles out of the total 110,999 miles among the three years. The 
number of personnel traveling greater than 50 miles, in 2005, was 65 percent. This is 
possibly attributed to the integration of reservists and the increased level of reserves 
recalled helping combat the arduous war on terror.  
As stated above, people traveling greater than 50 miles changed very little from 
2003 to 2004. The greatest change in the number of personnel traveling greater than 50 














































Figure 13.   Fiscal Years versus Number of Miles Traveled Greater than 50 miles per 
Year  
 
Figure 14 shows a bar graph of the Readiness Commands and the number of 
personnel per month that drill at each command.  The chart indicates that Readiness 
Command South has 40 percent of the 7,423 monthly personnel drilling at their sites. 
This percentage may help explain the reason the South purchased 34 percent of the room 
nights at their region, as further discussed below.  Readiness Command Northwest, 
however, has 4 percent of the 7,423 people drilling at their site each month.  The relative 
difference in the numbers of persons drilling in each command might be attributed to the 
location of the reserve bases, the location of reservists with respect to the reserve bases, 
and the number reservist in each area. Table 1 shows the percentage of the number of 








































Figure 14.   Readiness Commands versus Number of Personnel per Month 
 
Table 1.   Percent of Drilling reservist Personnel per Month 
 













Figure 15 shows a bar graph shows Readiness Commands and average number of 
personnel per month traveling greater than 50 miles.  The Readiness Commands have a 
total of 3,084 personnel traveling each month greater than 50 miles.  REDCOM 
Northwest has 119 personnel traveling greater than 50 miles each month, which 
constitutes 3 percent of the total 3084 person traveling per month.  This is possibly 
attributed to Northwest having fewer personnel under their command. Readiness 
Command South, however, has 1270 people traveling greater than 50 miles each month.  
Readiness Command South has 41 percent of the 3089 personal traveling greater 50 
miles a month under their command.  It is reasonable to suppose that it has the highest 

















































Figure 15.   Readiness Command versus Number of Personnel per Month Traveling 








Table 2.   Readiness Command versus Percentage of Personnel Traveling Greater 
Than 50 Miles 
 
Readiness Commad Percentage of Personnel Traveling 










Figure 16 shows the relationship between Readiness Commands and average 
number of nights purchased per Readiness Command.   The Readiness Commands 
purchased a total of 21,556 room nights per month. Readiness Command South 
purchased 34 percent of the 21,556 rooms nights per month. South has a minimal number 
of Combined Bachelor Quarters rooms available which is undoubtedly a cause ( Table 3). 
It has two Combined Bachelor Quarters available. This factor, combined with the 
relatively large number of persons traveling greater than 50 miles in the South, 41.18% of 
the total number of persons traveling greater than 50 miles, undoubtedly accounts for the 
need for hotel accommodations (See Table 3). South has two Combined Bachelors 
Quarters available in Corpus Christi, Texas and in Ft. Worth, Texas.  
By comparison, Northwest purchased fewer room nights. Northwest purchased 
four percent of the 21,556 rooms in the Readiness Command to accommodate a portion 




of person traveling greater than 50 miles. This is possibly due to a grater availability of 
Combined Bachelor Quarters, sharing quarters among the 119 personnel traveling greater 
than 50 miles, a relatively accurate forecast of the number of rooms needed by the 
Northwest, or a combination of these. that are located in Corpus Christi and Ft. Worth, 
Texas. (rooms available) Northwest, however, purchased fewer room nights. It purchases 
4 percent of the 21,556 rooms in the Readiness Command.  This is possibly due to more 
Combined Bachelor Quarters available or the 119 personnel traveling greater than 50 
miles per month share rooms.  
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Figure 16.   Readiness Commands versus Average Number of Nights Purchased per 






Table 3.   Readiness Commands versus the Percentage of Room Nights Purchased per 
Month 
 











Figure 17 shows the Readiness Commands and the average number of personal 
and nights per month between Mid-West and South (Figure 17). Readiness Commands 
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Figure 17.   Readiness Commands(Mid-West and South) comparison versus Average 
Number of Personnel and Nights Per Month 
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Figure 18 shows that the relationship of Readiness Commands and the average 
dollars spent per month for contract berthing. The Readiness Commands have obligated a 
total of $828,716 per month for contract berthing. Readiness Command Southwest and 
Mid-Atlantic obligated 9.21 and 8.92 percent respectively.  Although Southwest 
obligated almost equal amount of funding to contract berthing as Mid-Atlantic, 
Southwest has 3 percent more personnel drilling each month, 1.36 percent more 
personnel traveling, and purchased 2.3 percent less rooms than Southwest, yet Southwest 
yet obligates 30 percent more per month than Mid-Atlantic. It appears that on a per- 
month basis a 30 percent difference is not significant, but over the fiscal year it 
complicates future contract funding.   
Readiness Command South obligates 34 percent of the total $828,716 of contract 
berthing funding. As discussed above, this may be attributed to the fact that South has 41 
percent of its total personnel traveling over 50 miles to their assigned drill locations yet 
as limited BOQ; therefore, South foresees a need to use local hotels (Table 2).  
Readiness Command Northwest data is the lowest with 4.78 percent of the total 
number of personal per month, 3.86 percent personnel traveling and 4.17 percent of 
purchased rooms nights. The data further indicates that Northwest remains consistently 
the lowest among Readiness Commands obligating funding to hotels. This fact might be 
attributed to Northwest having fewer personnel and many reserve centers that covers a 
vast number of states.  For example, Northwest covers a region comprising ten states and 
has 18 Reserve Center regions with few military lodging facilities. Northwest Readiness 
Commanders apparently ensure reservists utilize BOQ rooms on Navy, Army, Air Force 
and National Guard installations before obligating funding to local hotel.  In addition, the 
local hotels may reserve a number of rooms for the drilling reservists. Figure 17 shows 
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Figure 19 shows a small sample size of a regression line. The plot shows a 
positive relationship between the Readiness Commands to the average night’s purchased 
per month. The relationship is for the whole group (some of the commands have larger 
residuals and some have smaller residuals). The chart indicates that 80 percent of the 
variation in average nights purchased per month per Readiness Command is explained by 
the Readiness Command Personnel.  The remaining 20 percent is unexplained.  In 
general, the higher the percentage of R², the better the model fits the data and shows the 
measure of strength of that relationship.  Readiness Commands Northwest, Northeast, 
Southwest and Southeast have a positive relationship to the number of nights purchased 
each month.  The monthly nights purchased for Mid-Atlantic and Mid-West are related 
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Figure 19.   Readiness Command versus Average Nights Purchased per Month per 
Readiness Command 
 
Figure 20 shows the relationship of Readiness Command Personnel to Average 
Number of Personnel per Month per Readiness Command. As the scatter plot indicates, 
the dots represent personnel.  This chart indicates that 94 percent of the variation in 
average number of personnel per month is explained by the Readiness Commands 
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Figure 20.   Readiness Commands versus Average Number of Personnel per Month  
 
Figure 21 shows a plot of the relationship between fiscal years and reserve 
population per Readiness Command.  Readiness Command personnel (both officers and 
enlisted), in 2003, was 21 percent of the total 300,006 combined fiscal years.  From 2003 
to 2004, the population per fiscal year of Readiness Command decreased to 19.8 percent 
of the total population.  The population in per year, in 2005, increased to 58 percent of 
the total population.  The personnel growth rate of the fiscal years increased more than 
98%.  According to a GAO report, “In 2004, the Navy completed a study of how many 
selected reserve personnel are needed to support the active force in meeting current and 
future mission requirements.” The GAO recommended that Navy Reserve consider cost-







on current data.  Moreover, the Navy Reserve should “allocate the required resource to 
maintain current Navy mission documents that would provide a valid baseline for 











































Figure 21.   Fiscal Years versus Total Personnel of Readiness Command 
 
Figure 22 shows a plot of the overall increase in the amount of amount of nights 
purchased per year by Readiness Commands.  The number of nights purchased per year 
increased from 203,381 to 213,308 in 2003 and 2004 respectively.    However, Readiness  
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Commands nights increased significantly from 213,308 to 486,435 in 2004 and 2005 
respectfully.  Readiness Commands purchased 3.3 the number of nights in 2005 relative 
to 2004.   
































Figure 22.   Fiscal Years versus Amount of Nights Purchased Year 
 
Figure 23 shows a plot of the overall increase in the number of sailors who travel 
greater than 50 miles radius to their drill site.  The number of personnel traveling beyond 
the 50 mile limit to their permanent drilling site decreased from 25,210 to 23,741 in 2003 
and 2004 respectively.  Again, this chart shows the relationship between the fiscal year 
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Figure 23.   Fiscal Year versus Total Number of Personnel Traveling Greater Than 50 
miles  
 
Figure 24 shows bar graphs of the increase or decrease in military personnel, 
number of miles traveled greater than 50 miles to their assigned drill location, and the 
number of nights purchased per fiscal year.  The sample data indicated that, on average, 
62,590, 59,557, and 174,589 were the number of personnel in 2003, 2004, and 2005 
respectively that traveled to their perspective reserve centers.  The personnel manning 
between 2003 and 2004 indicates a 5 percent decrease in personnel.  Conversely, fiscal 
year 2004 and 2005 indicates an increase of more than over 90 percent in personnel.  This 
increasing trend is possibly derived from the Global War on Terror coupled with the 
Department of Defense’s Base Realignment and Closure strategy and policy.  The 
number of personnel traveling greater than the 50 miles from their home has significantly 
increased from 2003 to 2005.  The graph indicates that in 2003, 2004, and 2005 that 
25,210, 23741, and 78,293 personnel traveled more than 50 miles respectively. There was 




Conversely, between fiscal year 2004 and 2005 there was an increase of more than 98 
percent.  As indicated, the graph shows that the relationship of personnel and the number 
of miles traveled increase and decrease proportionately. 
For Fiscal Year 2003, 2004, and 2005 figures indicates that the Navy Reserve 
appropriated funds for 203,381, 213,308, and 486,435 nights respectively.  The number 
of nights purchased increased somewhat (2 percent) in fiscal year 2004; in fiscal year 






































Figure 24.    Fiscal Years versus Number of Obligation 
 
Figure 25 shows a plot of the amount of funding flows by fiscal year. The fiscal 
year expenditures were $7,704,665, $11,002,452, and $18,278,782 for 2003, 2004, and 






























Figure 26 shows a plot of the Navy Reserve Readiness Command (REDCOM) 
only.  There is a positive relationship between the average people traveling greater than 
50 miles.  The greater the demand of personal traveling equals the greater supply of 
nights to accommodate people.   
It is interesting to see that REDCOM South has on average 1,350 people who 
travel more than 50 miles to their drilling site whereas REDCOM Mid-Atlantic (inclusive 
of NAR Willow Grove) demand of 3,133 people is supplied by purchasing more than 
6,000 nights.     
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Figure 26.   Average Miles Greater Than 50 miles versus Average Nights Purchased  
 
Figure 27 shows a plot of the number of personnel to the expenditures per person.  
Moreover, there are a few commands that have expenditures above $200.00. Therefore, 





Personnel vs Expense Per Person




























Figure 27.   Number of Personnel versus Expenditures Per Person  
 
Figure 28 shows a plot of the Navy Air Reserve and Navy Air Force units.  As the 
purchases increases the price per night per person decreases, for example, NAR New 
Orleans purchased approximately 800 nights for their drilling reservist which cost them 
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Figure 28.   Number of Nights Purchased versus Price per Night per Person 
 
Figure 29 shows a bar graph of the relationship between Navy Air Reserve 
Commands and the average unit cost per night for contract berthing.  Navy Air Facilities 
Washington is more expensive than the other commands.  Washington’s unit cost per 
night is 24 percent of the total $242. Let’s compare the unit cost per night of Atlanta with 
Washington, there is a slight decrease in the percentages.  Navy Air Reserve Atlanta 
charges 21 percent of the total $242.  I speculate that Washington and Atlanta unit cost 
are high because of the laws of supply and demand. If the Navy Air Reserve command 
purchased more units from hotels then the unit cost per hotel room would be cheaper. 
Conversly, in Atlanta and Washington scenarios it purchased fewer rooms which 
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Figure 29.   Navy Air Reserve Contracting Berthing Cost per Night 
 
Figure 30 shows bar graphs of both Navy Reserve Readiness Commands 
(REDCOM) and Navy Air Reserve. The largest commands REDCOM South, on average, 
purchases 7332 rooms per month lodging personnel.  Conversely, REDCOM Northwest, 
on average, purchases 898 rooms per month lodging personnel.  However, the chart also 
depicts the smaller commands such as the Navy Activities.  These activities indicate that 
NAR Whidbey purchases average of rooms 857.42. NAR Whidbey purchases more 
rooms per night because they have less barracks and more inactive duty training (IDT) 
personnel traveling beyond of 50 miles. Regarding Readiness Command Southwest, the 
graph suggests that San Diego has more personnel; but has a higher local population.  




of the drillers drill at the center, they all drill at their gaining commands.  In fact, out of 
7000 drillers only 300 to 500 drill at the center.  In addition, there are 100 hundred 
Bachelors Enlisted Quarters (BEQ) rooms utilized for drillers. On the other hand,  the 
reason for Pt. Mugu having a larger average nights purchased is because it is located in a 
remote area with few BEQ/BOQ rooms. When Pt. Mugu has reached its capacity in the 
government quarters then it must utilize hotels.  The 30 personnel received by Pt. Mugu 
are unlikely to be from the local community which increases cost.   
When comparing Readiness Commands Mid-Atlantic to READINESS 
COMMAND Southeast, it is evident that they are both larger commands.  At a glance, 
one would think that Southeast would spend more for contract berthing, but actually Mid-
Atlantic contracts more rooms because of the lack of Combined Bachelor Quarters to 
lodge Inactive Duty Trainers (IDTs).  However, when one compares NAR Whidbey to 
NAR Norfolk it appears that NAR Whidbey should purchase less contract berthing than 
NAR Norfolk because of less personnel drilling.  On average, NAR Whidbey trains more 
than 64 drilling reservists per month and NAR Norfolk trains 113 drilling reservist per 
month.  Therefore, the data leads me to believe that because NAR Norfolk has a higher 
number of drilling reservists than NAR Whidbey so their cost of contract berthing should 
be higher.  It would be true if they had the same amount of rooms available to Inactive 
Duty Trainers, but they don’t.    According to Brunswick Maine Senior Chief Store 
Keeper Tisha Phillips, “NAR Norfolk purchases fewer room nights of contract berthing 
than NAR Whidbey because of a greater availability at the CBQ.”  Combined Bachelors 
Quarters, for NAR Norfolk, are available at Naval Station Dam Neck, Naval Station 
Little Creek, NAS Oceana, and NAS Norfolk.” One can conclude that this availability 
significantly reduces the need to use contract berthing as compared to other Navy 
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Figure 30.   Average Nights of Rooms Purchased by Command 
 
Figure 31 shows a plot of the average annual nights purchased versus the annual 
personnel traveling greater than 50 miles. It appears to be no relationship between the 
average monthly nights and personnel.  In fact, there is a 13 percent correlation between 




















0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Room Nights Purchased



































   
Figure 31.   Average Annual Nights Purchased versus Average Annual Personnel 
Traveling Greater Than 50 miles  
 
Figure 32 shows the room nights per person per year by Navy Air Reserve and 
Navy Air Facilities Commands (NAR & NAF). NAF Washington purchased 4750 rooms 
per year approximately 350 people.  NAF Washington has been consistent, purchasing 13 
rooms nights per year per person for their Selected Reserve personnel.  Similar to NAF 
Washington is NAR Whidbey.  NAR Whidbey, on average, purchases 10,289 room 
nights per year for 430 Selected Reservist traveling over 50 miles.   NAR Whidbey, since 
fiscal year 2005, has been consistent in purchasing 23 room nights per person per year for 
their Selected Reserve personnel who travel greater 50 miles.   
The Navy Air Reserve and Navy Air Facilities purchases were relatively 
consistent with the exception of NAR Pt. Mugu and NAR Norfolk.    NAR Pt. Mugu’s 
room’s nights per person increased from 23 in 2003 to 28 in 2004. In 2004, NAR Pt. 




in 2003.  In 2005, however, NAR Pt. Mugu purchased the same 23 rooms per person per 
year for the Selected Reservist as it did in 2003.  I suggest asking the Readiness 
Commanders for an explanation to the sudden increase.  While NAR Pt. Mugu increased, 
NAR Norfolk decreased the number of rooms nights purchased per year per person.  As 
the chart indicates, NAR Norfolk purchased an average of 7 nights per year per person 
for their Selected Reservist.  In 2005, however, NAR Norfolk rooms nights purchased per 
year plummeted from 7 nights to 2 nights.  NAR Norfolk anomaly is uncertain, but what 
is certain is that Norfolk room nights plummeted from 4073 room nights to 1056 rooms’ 
nights purchased per year. The number of nights purchased decreased by four rooms per 
night per person.  I suggest Readiness Commands request an explanation for these 
findings.   
 
Navy Air Reserve Room Nights Purchased 
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Figure 33 shows the average room nights purchased per person per year per 
person by their Readiness Commands (REDCOM).  Readiness Command Northwest on 
average purchased 10,775 rooms per year that provide rooms for approximately 1,422 
Selective Reservists. Readiness Command Northwest has consistently provided 8 rooms 
per person per year for lodging.  The other REDCOMs have been relatively consistent 
with the number of room nights purchased per year for their Selective Reservists with the 
exception of REDCOM Mid-Atlantic.  REDCOM Mid-Atlantic purchased 23 room 
nights in fiscal year 2003 and by 2004 the number of room nights per year reduced to 20.  
It is interesting to note that it remained steady  at 20 nights.  In 2003 Mid-Atlantic room 
nights purchased decreased from 35,815 to 32,918 and then its number increased to 
37,514 rooms nights by 2005.  The level of 20 nights is attributable to a steady increase 
of Selected Reservist traveling; Mid-Atlantic personnel traveling greater than 50 miles to 
the permanent drilling site.   
 







































































Figure 34 shows an overall ratio of spending among the Readiness Commands. 
Readiness Command Southwest was authorized $.88 million in fiscal year 2003 and 
spent $.83 million for contract berthing. Southwest spent 94 percent of the actual budget 
with 6 percent of funding at the end of the fiscal year. In fiscal year 2004, Southwest 
authorized funding of $.88  million increased by 1.26 times more than fiscal year 2003 to 
$1.1 million. In other words, Southwest under spent by 20 percent of its authorized 
funding; therefore the remaining 80 percent was spent on contract berthing.  Southwest is 
shows a gradual increase in authorized funding for each fiscal year. In fiscal year 2005, 
Southwest authorized funding increased to $1.4 million which indicates a 1.3 times 
increase from the previous year.  Again, Southwest under spent by 68 percent of their 
authorized funding.  Southwest trends indicates that the more money authorized the less 
funding is being spent. I would speculate that they have less personnel drilling or more 
Combined Bachelor’s Quarters available.  
Readiness Command Southeast shows that, in fiscal year 2003, it was authorized 
$.95 million and spent $1.5 million. It overspent funding by 64 percent. In 2004, 
Southeast authorized funding increase 1.9 times more than 2003. Southeast funding 
increased from $.95 million to $1.8 million. It shows that Southeast underspent 
authorized funding by 8 percent and actually spent 92 percent of the authorized contract 
berthing funding. In 2005, Southeast funding increased by 1 percent more than $1.8 
million. In other words, Southeast was 2 percent within their authorized budget; 
subsequently, spending 98 percent of fiscal year 2005 contracted budget.  
Readiness Command Northeast, in fiscal year 2003, was authorized $.89 million 
and spent $.87 million. It shows that it underspent its budget by 2 percent and allocated 
98 percent to contract berthing. Although Northeast was authorized funding was 
increased 1.18 times more than the previous year. It overspent funding by 2 percent in 
2004. In 2005, Northeast spent 99 percent of their authorized funding. I speculate that in 
2004 Northeast had an influx of reserve in which I suggest asking the Readiness 
Commander.     
Readiness Command Northwest, in fiscal year 2003, was authorized $.46 million 




their authorized funding. I speculate that Northwest has a high influx of personnel 
needing lodging. As a result of overspending, funding increased from $.46 million to $.50 
million. Northwest’s funding increased by 1.084 more times than 2003; I speculate that 
Northwest spent 99 percent of their authorized funding because of the need for 
contracting berthing. Northwest trends for all fiscal years shows an increase from $.46 
million to $.51 million. As the data indicates, the authorized funding increased while the 
actual amount spent decreased per fiscal year. In 2005, the graph indicate that Northwest 
under spent their authorized funding by 5 percent.    
Readiness Command Mid-West, in fiscal year 2003, was authorized $7.3 million 
and actually spent $.7 million. The chart shows that Mid-West underspent their 
authorized funding by 3 percent. In 2004, Mid-West authorized funding increased by 1.6 
more times than 2003. In 2005, Mid-West authorized funding decreased 6 percent; 
however, Mid-West was authorized $1.1 million, but spent $2.9 million. It spent 1.62 
more funding in 2005 than any other year. The authorized funding trends steady 
increased from fiscal year 2003 and 2004, but in 2005 the authorized funding decreased 
which was the result of overspending. I suggest asking the Readiness Commander for an 
answer.  
Readiness Command Mid-Atlantic, in 2003, was authorized $1 million and 
actually spent $.87 million dollars. This chart shows it underspent authorized funding by 
14 percent. In 2004, it underspent funding by 17 percent; however, in 2005, Mid-Atlantic 
overspent it funding by 1 percent. In 2003, Mid-Atlantic authorized $1 million dollars, 
but didn’t spent their authorized limt. In 2004, the authorized funding of $.956 million 
decreased by 6 percent. I speculate that it was because of the 14 percent underspending in 
the previous year. In 205, Mid-Atlantic funding of $.982 million increased 1.026 more 
times than 2004. In others the 2005 authorized amount of $.982 increased by 2.6 percent.  
Readiness Command South 2003 authorized fiscal amount was $1.2 million and it 
actually spent $.855 million. It actually under spent by 31 percent of its contract berthing 
funds. In 2005, South’s authorized funding increased by 1.026 from $1.2 million to $1.2 
million. The chart between the two fiscal years indicates a steady growth in authorized 




skewed. Its authorized funding increased from by 1.05 more times than the 2004 funding 
of $1.26 million. In 2005, South’s anomaly is that it overspent 5.39 times more than its 
authorized funding. In comparing the previous year amount of $.936 million to the $8.5 
million actually spent this indicates that South spent 9 times more than it actually spent in 


















































Figure 34.   Readiness Command versus Ratio of Spending (the purpose of the graph is 
to show that any ratio above 0.00 shows that the Readiness Commands 
overspent funds for the fiscal year; conversely, below the 0.00 show that 
Readiness Commands have under spent funds for the fiscal year) 
 
Figure 35 shows a plot of the similarities and differences between Readiness 
Commands South and Mid-West. The similarities of both South and Mid-West are that 
they both were authorized $1 million on average for contract berthing funding. Also, they 




Second, as the graph indicates actual spending exceeded their authorized amount by 1.62 
and 5.39 times for Mid-West and South, respectively.     
Assumptions about Readiness Command Over and Under spending for Berthing: 
This portion of the MBA project presents assumptions about the Readiness 
Commands. Readiness Commanders provided data for the population of sailors requiring 
service for fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005; however, from 2000-2002 it is assumed: 
• 10 percent increase in population from 2000-2002. 
• Southeast room assets of 24,000 is the base for estimating room assets needed by the 
other Readiness Commands. 
• The population of drilling reservists using Combined Bachelors Quarters is 60 
percent of the population needing lodging services. 
• Cost per Night to occupy the Combined Bachelor Quarters is a standard rate of $25 
per night. 
• The average market price for hotels are $84.79. 
Overall, I assumed that from 2000-2002 each Readiness Commands population 
increased by 10 percent each year.  I based this assumption on the 2003 population of 
sailors requiring lodging services. For example, I used Southeast 2003 population of 4310 
and assumed that 2002 was 90 percent of 4310 which yield 3879. In 2000, however, 
Readiness Command Southeast had 3,578 drilling reservists needing lodging services per 
year.  Commander Navy Installations Command (CNIC) Program Manager,  Mr. Dean 
Reynolds said, “It is estimated that Southeast has 24,000 rooms assets available for 
lodging.” As a result, I estimated the availability of rooms for the other Readiness 
Commands by using Southeast’s number of room assets as a base number. I knew that 
Southeast had the highest population of sailors requiring lodging services and that the 
number of rooms assets were 24,000. Therefore, I multiplied the smaller population with 
the largest number of room assets and divided by the highest population.  For example, in 
2000, I multiplied Northwest’s population of sailors needing lodging by Southeast’s room 
assets of 24,000 and divided by Southeast’s population of sailors needing lodging to 





I assumed that the population of sailors utilizing the Combine Bachelor’s Quarters 
is 60 percent. I assume that most sailors are able to use the Combine Bachelor’s Quarters. 
For those who are not able to occupy a room in the CBQ are privileged to use local hotels 
at the governments expense. I assumed that the average cost per night at the CBQ is $25 
for all Readiness and Regional Commands. I assumed the cost per night to stay at the a 
hotel was $84.79 based on a the an internet source from Forbes Fortune 500 report 


































Figure 35.   Fiscal Year versus Ratio of Spending per Readiness Command 
 
Figure 36 shows a plot of the actual versus the forecasted time period which is 
2006. The Excel chart uses cost data from 2000-2005 and project a trend. In other words, 
the blue plot indicates that as annual cost of contracting berthing reaches the end of the 
periods cost of contracted berthing will decrease; however, the pink line indicates the 
opposite. The seasonal forecast plot shows that as the cost of contracted berthing reaches 




inconsistencies in the ratio of personnel traveling greater than 50 versus the number of 
nights spent (see Figure 8). Seasonal forecasting, the pink line, states that over time as the 
Navy continue to purchase room nights the cost will increase, as opposed to the blue line 




























Figure 36.   Annual Cost of Contract Berthing versus Seasonalized Forecasts  
 
Figure 37 shows a plot of the actual dollars spent and the forecasted dollar 
amount. This plot supports Figure 34 that states that over time the forecasted annual 
contract berthing will increase as opposed to decreasing. If time permitted, I suggest 




























Figure 37.   Actual Value of Contract Berthing versus Forecasted Value 
 
C.  CONCLUSION 
Manpower personnel are important! One reason why contract berthing is 
important it provides a alternate lodging plan for more than 3000 personnel each month 
traveling more the 50 miles to their assigned reserve center (see Figure 14). The chart 
shows that from the 3089 personnel traveling greater than 50 miles each month 41 
percent of people are from Readiness Commands South. As compared to the Mid-West 
region that had 26 percent of the people traveling to the designated place of work (see 
Figure 1). In other words, these two commands are obligating more funds than their 
counterparts. I speculate that this could be from the lack of rooms available on base to 
adequately accommodate its 41 percent of personnel.  Finally, manpower is important 
because people comfort and rooms purchased to accommodate the people fighting the 




Financial Management of contracts berthing is important! One reason is to limit 
the amount of funds spent. For example, Figure 15 states the Readiness Command 
purchased an aggregate of  21,556 rooms nights each month; assuming that the unit cost 
for each room was $80 dollars that would yield a total cost of  $1.7 million.  From the 
21,556 room nights, Readiness Command South purchased 34 percent of the total rooms. 
Secondly, it is the duty of the controller to be guardians of the public funds for the tax 
payer. Second, contract berthing is a privilege and not and entitlement, many experts  
feel as though it is important to give the tax payer or stakeholders a picture of  the flow of 
their funds(see Figure 2).  Finally, financial management of contract berthing is important 
because on average must command such as South and Mid-West overspend their 
authorized amount of funding dollars (see Figure 32). In others, the chart shows that 
Readiness Command South 2003 authorized fiscal amount was $1.2 million and it 
actually spent $.855 million. It actually under spent by 31 percent of its contract berthing 
funds. In 2005, South’s authorized funding increased by 1.026 from $1.2 million to $1.2 
million. The chart between the two fiscal years indicates a steady growth in authorized 
funding and a normal spending rate. In 2005; however, South trend looks slightly 
skewed. Its authorized funding increased from by 1.05 more times than the 2004 funding 
of $1.26 million. In 2005, South’s anomaly is that it overspent 5.39 times more than it’s 
authorized funding. In comparing the previous year amount of $.936 million to the $8.5 
million actually spent this indicates that South spent 9 times more than it actually spent in 
2005.     
Time-Forecasting is another important aspect of financial management. Figure 8 
shows that Figure 8 shows the aggregate number of personnel, number of personal 
traveling greater than 50 miles, and the number of nights purchased by Readiness 
Commands.  There has been an by 58 percent from 182,668 to 442, 755 in the number of 
nights purchased.  With an increase in personnel the number of nights purchased, it is 
obvious that the number of personnel traveling greater than 50 miles and the number of 
personnel has increased proportionately as depicted in the graph.   The interesting trend is 
the ratio of nights purchased versus personnel greater than 50 miles. The graph shows 




of people traveling decrease by 3 percent. Purchasing more rooms would give the 
impression that there are more people traveling greater than 50 miles. Therefore, an 
increase in personnel and the consolidation of bases the Navy will be forced to contract 
more rooms from the local community. Instead less people are traveling greater than 50 


































This research suggests that current contract berthing policy maybe inefficient in 
terms of manpower, time, money, and Fleet Support.  As Active-Reserve Integration is 
realized, a better method of providing berthing to eligible DRILRES must be identified.  
Existing berthing policy will certainly require revision.  
B. DISCUSSION 
 
• DRILRES will increasingly drill at the convenience of the Fleet.  In most cases, 
DRILRES will not drill as a unit according to a published annual schedule.  
Additionally, DRILRES will not necessarily drill on two consecutive days.   
• DRILRES are becoming more responsive to the Fleet, providing support with little 
or no advanced notice. 
• Short-notice IDT periods may result in a greater number of commercially-procured 
rooms versus government quarters.  Additionally, as DRILRES evolve into 
individual assets vice unit assets, the likelihood of double occupancy diminishes. 
• The bottom line is that the current process that requires FTS intervention for making 
and canceling DRILRES reservations is obsolete. 
• Done properly, approximately 50% of an NRA Storekeeper’s time is devoted to 
managing berthing issues.  The remainder of that time is spent on NRA logistics 
support and DRILRES uniform processing. 
 
C. FINDINGS 
This data indicated differing experience with contract berthing by region and site. 
Below is a list of findings that were significant: 
• Contract Berthing Expenditures doubled from fiscal year 2003 to 2005. If this trend 
continues, contract berthing can cause significant budgetary impacts.  (Figure 25).  
When using past data to forecast cost; it is clear that the forecast value of contract 
berthing will likely continue to increase (Figure 37).  
• According to the Readiness Commands forecasts, contract berthing costs are 
expected to decrease at the end of the fiscal years.  However, the opposite conclusion 
comes from standard forecasting methods; the seasonal forecast plot shows that the 
cost of contract berthing is expected to increase at the end of the years. Seasonal 
forecasting helps explain the inconsistencies in the ratio of personnel traveling 




• In 2005, the reservists traveling greater than 50 miles steadily increased while the 
ratio of nights to personnel traveling greater than 50 miles decreased. It is expected it 
to grow proportionately. (Figure 9).   
•  There were significant differences between budgeted and actual contract berthing 
expenditures.  For example, Readiness Command South overspent five times its 
actual authorized budget for fiscal year 2005 (Figure 34). 
• Personnel Traveling Greater than 50 miles versus Average Nights Purchased 
highlights differences between the small and large Readiness Commands. Readiness 
Command policies and conditions (or both) appear less homogenous than expected 
under a uniform DON policy (Figure 26). 
• The Navy Air Reserve experience (in Number of Personal versus the Expenditures 
per person) seems to reflect quantity discounts. In other words, the more reservists 
utilizing contract berthing the lower the cost per unit. Conversely, the less the 
demand for contract berthing in the other region the higher the cost per person for 
contract berthing( Figure 27 and 28)  
• Readiness Commands versus average room nights per person per year vary largely 
by region. It is interesting to note that Readiness Command South has the highest 
number of reservists drilling, but purchased four times less rooms per person per 
year than (for example) Readiness Command Mid-Atlantic (Figure 33). 
  
D.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of this project was to analyze the potential growth to the post-
BRAC contract berthing budget line, assuming a continuance of current Contract 
Berthing policy. Although this project brought forth some interesting facts, however, 
limited data prohibited using historical cost data to predict future cost. There is good 
reason to believe that local commanders are applying the current policy in different ways 
quite possibly in response to differing local conditions. Furthermore, to more accurately 
predict future cost of Contract Berthing, the following is suggested:  
• Readiness Commanders put procedures in place to more accurately track Contract 
berthing expenditures.  This should make possible more accurate estimates of 
Contracting Berthing Costs. 
• Commander Navy Reserve Forces support development of a Case Study of BRAC 
effects on contract berthing costs by using Pre-BRAC 2005 rounds. 
• Readiness Commanders collaborate with Commander Navy Installations Command 





• There is good reason to believe that low-hanging fruit for controlling contract 
berthing costs is found in exploiting Information Technology.  Specifically, the 
following measures are recommended for serious consideration by Commander 
Navy Reserve Forces: 
• Implement a real-time online database system allowing eligible members 
to make their own reservations with authorized contract berthing vendors under 
government contract.  If the CAC card interface, as used in Subsistence, were 
established, bulk funding could be given to the Combined Bachelor Quarters in all 
regions and upon checking into the facilities, the CAC card is scanned as a 
payment for the room charges.  The CAC cards would be loaded at the beginning 
of the fiscal year with the number of nights available for IDT purposes only and 
nights deducted as scanned.       
• Another implementation process that could be established with a real-time 
online database system utilizing civilian hotels would be for FISC or CNI to 
establish government contracts with various hotels with a firm fixed price per 
person on the room rates, once again, enabling eligible members to make their 
own reservations on line or over the phone.  Once the contracts were awarded, a 
“contract berthing account card” would be issued to all members that require 
commercial berthing that do not drill near a military installation that has a CBQ.  
The contract berthing card would have the number of nights authorized loaded at 
the beginning of the fiscal year and would be deducted as they are scanned.  The 
NRA could provide a list of authorized individuals to the hotel that could be 
loaded into their database with specific codes listed as to who may room together 
i.e., E-6 and below males with E-6 and below males could have a specific code 
that would identify to the vendor which individuals are allowed to share a room.  
The invoice is then faxed to the NRA for auditing and payment.  If this 
recommendation were to be adopted, NRAs could reduce logistics staff by 50%. 
• Implement a berthing allowance for eligible DRILRES.  This is a long-
term solution that entirely eliminates FTS logistics intervention and affords 
maximum flexibility to the DRILRES and the Fleet.  If this recommendation were 
to be adopted, the NRA logistics support staff could be reduced to a single 






























     COMNAVRESREDCOMSOUTHINST 11103.1A 
           N41 
          19 May 04 
        
A. COMNAVRESREDCOM SOUTH INSTRUCTION 11103.1A 
 
Subj:  BERTHING POLICY FOR SELECTED RESERVISTS (SELRES) DRILLING 
          AT NAVAL RESERVE READINESS COMMAND SOUTH 
Ref:   (a) COMNAVRESFORCOM P4000.1A  
Encl:   (1) Berthing Certification Letter                           R) 
           (2) Berthing Privilege Suspension Warning Letter      R)  
 
1.   Purpose.  To provide sign-up and no-show policy guidance for the berthing 
administration of SELRES performing multiple drills.  This does not apply to Inactive 
Duty Training Travel (IDTT), Annual Training (AT), Active Duty Training (ADT), or 
Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW). 
2.   Cancellation.  COMNAVRESREDCOMREG11INST 11103.1 
3.   Objective.  To facilitate active drill participation and mobilization training to the 
maximum extent, this command may     R) provide berthing at Navy expense for eligible 
SELRES per reference (a). 
4.   Eligibility  
a.  Per reference (a), SELRES must be:  
(1)  In a drill status performing inactive duty training (IDT). 
(2)  Reside more than 50 miles one-way between their residence and 





(3)  Perform at least eight hours of scheduled IDT on the day following 
use of berthing or four four-hour drills within a 48-hour period. 
b. Berthing is a privilege, not an entitlement, and may be denied for 
noncompliance with reference (a) and this instruction. 
5.   Action 
a.   Eligible SELRES:  
(1)  Complete and sign a Berthing Certification Letter, enclosure (1), 
annually. 
(2)  Request berthing from Logistics (N4) by filling out and signing a 
Berthing Request Sheet not later than 30 days prior to the date berthing is required.  
Berthing Request Sheets are available for signature 60 days in advance.  If not present the 
drill weekend prior to the month berthing is required, and the member had not previously 
signed the berthing list, the member may phone/fax/call the Logistics Department to be 
added to the list.  Berthing may be denied if within 21 days of the drill weekend required.  
SELRES are strongly encouraged to make berthing requests known 60 days in advance to 
help control costs.  
(3)  Under no circumstances will SELRES make their own berthing 
reservation.  If a SELRES does so, the SELRES is financially responsible for that 
reservation. 
(4)  The individual SELRES is responsible for canceling berthing 
reservations no later than 1200, the day prior to the  (R) reservation, by calling the 
REDCOM South Logistics Department.  Failure to cancel reservations that cause a 
charge to REDCOM South will result in the following: 





(b)  Second violation (within six months of the first violation):  
SELRES will be denied berthing for six months. 
(c)  Third violation (within 12 months of the first violation):  
Indefinite denial of berthing privileges.  
(5)  SELRES that do not satisfactorily perform at least two four-hour 
drills on the day following the use of berthing, or four four-hour drills within a 48-hour 
period will be required to reimburse the Navy for the cost of the berthing provided.  
Reimbursement to the Navy is also required for any charges incurred for damages to the 
berthing activity caused by individual acts of negligence. 
b.   REDCOM South (N4):  
(1)  Ensure a copy of this instruction is provided to SELRES requiring 
berthing. 
(2)  Annually, each fiscal year, require all SELRES using berthing to 
recertify their eligibility.  Maintain a file of all certification/recertification forms. 
(3)  Arrange, pay for, and notify SELRES of confirmed berthing 
arrangements, ensuring berthing is double-occupancy per reference (a) when configured. 
(4)  Track berthing procedure violations, initiating appropriate action 
when required. 
(5)  Withhold berthing privileges for a specified period of time from 
members who abuse these privileges. 
c.   Unit Commanding Officers/Officers in Charge receiving berthing 
assistance from REDCOM South: 
(1)  Counsel their personnel when notification of berthing procedure 





(2)  Initiate disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, if warranted. 
                             //s// 
 K. R. HEMPEL 
Distribution:   
 
COMNAVRESREDCOMSOUTHINST 5216.1R List A, B-2 , C 




Berthing Certification Letter 
 
       Date: ______________ 
 
From:  _____________________________________________________ 
To:    Commander, Naval Reserve Readiness Command South (N4) 
 
Subj:  REQUEST FOR BERTHING 
 
1.  I request overnight berthing for scheduled Inactive Duty Training drill periods. 
 
2.  I certify that I commute more that 50 miles from my home to my permanent drill site 
following the most direct route.  I agree to successfully complete eight hours of 
scheduled drills, exclusive of the meal hour, on the day following my berthing use.  I will 
sign up for berthing in the Logistics Department (N4) not later than 30 days prior to the 
date berthing is required.  If I am unable to do so in person, I understand I may request 
berthing by phone (817-782-6643/1/2), email (howard.smith@navy.mil), or fax (817-
782-6808).  Failure to meet this deadline can result in denial of berthing at Government 
expense.  If I must cancel my reservation, I must contact the Logistics Department by 
1200, the day before berthing is required.  If declared a “no show,” I understand I will be 
denied berthing privileges for at least six months.  Government-provided berthing 
includes only the basic room charge.  Telephone calls and other personal charges are my 
responsibility and must be paid at checkout. 
 
3.  I understand if the Navy is charged for damage of berthing property, checkage of my 
drill pay will be initiated, or I will make restitution by check/money order.  I certify that I 
have been provided a copy of COMNAVRESREDCOMSOUTHINST 11103.1A and 
understand its contents. 
 K. S. EMMEL 





Berthing Policy local command: 
 
 
  NAVOPSUPCENCORPINST 11103.1C 
   N00C 
   
B. NAVOPSUPCEN CORPUS CHRISTI INSTRUCTION 11103.1C   
 
Subj:   CONTRACT BERTHING PROCEDURES FOR SELECTED RESERVE 
PERSONNEL 
 
Ref:    (a)  COMNAVRESFORINST P4000.1A 
           (b)  COMNAVREDCOMSOUTHINST 11103.1A 
 
Encl:   (1)  Berthing Certification Sheet 
           (2)  Berthing Audit Standard Procedures 
           (3)  Assignment for Berthing Audit/Audit Results 
           (4)  Unit Berthing Sign-Up Sheet 
           (5)  Berthing Warning/Suspension Letter 
 
1.   Purpose.  To provide amplifying guidance for the implementation of contract 
berthing procedures for eligible Selected Reservists performing multiple drills at Navy 
Operational Support Center Corpus Christi, TRAWING 2, TRAWING 4, CANTRA and 
HM-15.   
2.   Cancellation.  NAVRESCENCORPINST 11103.1B 
3.   Overview.  This instruction, along with references (a) and (b), authorizes a 
program to provide contract berthing for Selected Reservists at NOSC Corpus Christi 
Texas. Commercial berthing accommodations will be provided to eligible Navy 
Reservists only when Combined Bachelor Quarters (CBQ) is not available.  The 
provisions of this instruction do not apply to, and will not be used as authorization for, 




Annual Training (AT) periods, Active Duty Training (ADT), or Active Duty for Special 
Work (ADSW).   
4.   Eligibility.  As defined in references (a) and (b), to be eligible for contract 
berthing at the permanent drill site, Officer and Enlisted personnel of the Selected 
Reserve must:   
a.  Be in a drill status and performing Inactive Duty Training (IDT) at the 
permanent drill site, as designated in writing by the NOSC Commanding Officer.   
b.  Reside over 50 miles from the site where IDT’s are performed.   
c.   Perform at least eight hours of IDT (two drill periods), exclusive of meal 
hours, on the day before or day following the use of contract berthing, or four 4-hour 
drills within a 48-hour period. 
d.    Berthing is a privilege, not an entitlement, and may be denied for 
noncompliance with reference (a), (b), and this instruction. 
5.   Responsibilities.   
a.  Commanding Officer, Navy Operational Support Center Corpus Christi:  
Responsible for the acquisition of contract berthing in support of eligible SELRES. 
b.  Unit Commanding Officers/Officers In Charge: 
(1)  Counsel their personnel when notification of berthing procedure 
violations is received. 
(2)  Initiate disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice if warranted. 
(3)  Under no circumstances are unit POC’s to authorize direct billing 
with berthing vendors. NOSC Supply Petty Officers, are the only 
personnel who are authorized to approve direct billing. 
c.   Reservist:  
(1)  Ensure that all eligibility requirements are maintained. 
(2)  Under no circumstances will SELRES make their own berthing 
reservations. If a SELRES does so, the SELRES is financially responsible 




(3)  Submit Unit Berthing Request, through NOSC Supply Department, 
at least thirty- (30) calendar days in advance. 
(4)  Short notice (less than 30 calendar days) changes or additions must 
be received no later than 5 working days prior to drill weekend or it must 
be approved by the Commanding Officer, Navy Operational Support 
Center Corpus Christi based on input from the Unit Commanding Officer.  
(5)  Reschedules/Additional drills shall be accompanied by a 
reschedule form located on the command website.  Reschedules and 
additional drills require a 3 working day notice to procure berthing.    
(6)  Submit cancellations to Supply Department at NOSC Corpus 
Christi not later than 48 hours prior to the start of scheduled berthing.   
(7)  Sign Berthing Signature Record upon check-in at the hotel’s front 
desk (unless the lodging facility cannot provide the form). 
(8)  Assume and pay all additional room charges such as: charges 
incurred due to late check out, telephone calls, Pay-TV, beverage bills, 
room service, etc.  Damage caused as a result of negligence or misconduct 
during hotel occupancy, will be paid by the Reservist.   
(9)  Any berthing cost incurred by a person not in compliance with this 
instruction will be paid by the individual and not subject to reimbursement 
by the government.   
d.  Supply Department, Navy Operational Support Center Corpus Christi. 
(1)  Ensure a copy of this instruction is provided to SELRES. 
(2)  Maintain a file of Navy Reservists eligible for contract berthing 
using enclosure (1).   
(3)  Monthly, ensure the eligible members are verified via NSIPS. 
Provide NOSC Commanding Officer with a report of new members 





(4)  Make appropriate room reservations.  Rooms will be provided 
using the double-occupancy rule for commercial berthing, separating by 
gender and rank as follows:   
 
Senior Officers – Pay grades O5 and O6 
Junior Officers – Pay grades W1 through O4 
Senior Enlisted – Pay grades E7 through E9 
Junior Enlisted – Pay grades E1 through E6                                      
 Unit Commanding Officers will not stay with unit members 
    
  **Note**  
Suites and VIP rooms will only be used at the CBQs when no single rooms are available 
for the drill period. 
(5)  Provide the hotel with a listing of personnel authorized contract 
berthing (according to location).   
(6)  Provide the POOW at NOSC Corpus Christi a copy of SELRES 
Personnel authorized contract berthing and reserved locations. 
(7)  Monthly, compare berthing sign-up sheet to NSIPS database for 
eligibility.                        
(8)  Track berthing procedure violations, and initiate enclosure (5) 
when required. 
6.   No Show Policy.  “No Shows” are SELRES who request government berthing, 
but fail to cancel arrangements 48 hours prior to scheduled berthing.  To avoid any 
administrative and/or financial burden to the government by cost from “No Shows,” the 
following shall take place:   
 
First Violation: Warning 
Second Violation:  Loss of privileges for six months 





7.   Forms.  Forms listed in this instruction will be maintained by the Supply 
Department, NOSC Corpus Christi for use by all units.   Forms may be reproduced as 
necessary. 
                                   //s// 
        J. R. MARTINEZ 
Distribution: 
All Reserve Units 
 
C. CALCULATING BENEFITS AUTHORIZED FOR CONTRACT 
BERTHING 
If Government quarters are available (members drill on a base with a CBQ) 
NAR Brunswick has a total drilling population of 326.  Of those 326, 158 are 
authorized contract berthing (resides outside 50 miles from PDS).  Of the 158, 96 
members drill on base and utilized the CBQ and 62 members drill off site utilizing 
commercial hotels. 
CBQ breakdown:  Each member is given the following amounts for berthing as an 
authorized pay allowance.  E-6 and below-$7.50 per night, E-7 through O-44-$15.00 per 
night, and O-5 and above-$25.00 per night.   
          E-6 and below population:  70      
          E-7 through O-4 population:  18 
          O-5 and above population:  8 
   
***70 x $7.50   = $525.00 x 2 nights = $1,050.00 x 12 months = $ 12,600.00  
***18 x $15.00 = $270.00 x 2 nights = $   540.00 x 12 months = $   6,480.00 
***08 x $25.00 = $200.00 x 2 nights = $   400.00 x 12 months = $   4,800.00 
TOTAL FOR FISCAL YEAR:                                                       $ 23,880.00 
 
Off site contract berthing breakdown:  Allowance based on BAH rates for area where 
member drills and by pay grade.  (Exactly like AC). 
 
***Example used is FT. Devens, MA 
 
***E-4 and below population:  2  ($31.87 x 2 = $63.74 per weekend x 2 members = 
$127.48 
***E-5 population:  5 ($36.43 x 2 = $72.86 per weekend x 5 members = $364.30 




***E-7 population:  9 ($42.67 x 2 = $85.34 per weekend x 9 members = $768.06 
***E-8 population:  3 ($47.97 x 2 = $95.94 per weekend x 3 members = $287.82 
***E-9 population:  1 ($50.87 x 2 = $101.74 per weekend x 1 members = $101.74 
***W0-2 population:  2 ($47.93 x 2 = $95.86 per weekend x 2 members = $191.72 
***W0-3 population:  1 ($51.13 x 2 = $102.26 per weekend x 1 member = $102.26 
***O-1 population:  4 ($38.67 x 2 = $77.34 per weekend x 4 members = $309.36 
***O-2 population:  1 ($44.83 x 2 = $89.66 per weekend x 1 member = $89.66 
***O-3 population:  5 ($52.10 x 2 = $104.20 per weekend x 5 members = $521.00 
***O-4 population:  3 ($60.83 x 2 = $121.66 per weekend x 3 members = $364.98 
 
***O-5 population:  5 ($64.07 x 2 = $128.14 per weekend x 5 members = $640.70 
***O-6 population:  1 (69.00 x 2 = $138.00 per weekend x 1 member = $138.00 
TOTAL FOR OFF SITE MEMBERS PER MONTH:                               $4,868.60 
TOTAL FOR OFF SITE MEMBERS PER FY:                                       $58,423.20 
 
GRAND TOTAL FOR ON SITE AND OFF SITE WITH ALLOWANCE:    $82,303.20 
GRAND TOTAL FOR NAR BRUNSWICK FY05 BERTHING:               $82,219.00 
DIFFERENCE:                                                                                                   $84.20 
  
 
The BAH rate was determined by taking the BAH allowance for the area where the 
members drill and dividing by 30.  Realize that the figures are not 100% accurate due to 
gaining/losing members that are beyond our control, but figures are used as an average.  
Based on the total costs, there is minimal costs difference.  Other factors that should be 
considered in the bottom line is the pay and allowance that an active duty storekeepers is 
paid that could be eliminated, approximately $40,000 per year.  Manpower is reduced, 
administrative costs are eliminated, and greater flexibility and responsibility are given to 
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